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1. Introduction.  
 H. P. Grice’s published work on language and communication offers two (related) accounts 
of the rational structure of ordinary conversational practices.  One approach reflects on 
communication from a macro or global perspective.  Working at this level, Grice has articulated 
a Cooperative Principle (CP) and associated Maxims, which attempt to represent how 
conversations are rationally organized with respect to goals and objectives accepted by 
participants.  Grice’s other account adopts a micro-focus on what is essential to an utterance’s 
having meaning in the context of a particular effort to communicate.  This latter approach offers 
an analysis of our ordinary concept of saying and meaning something.  Both the CP  and the 
analysis of utterance-meaning attempt to represent critical respects in which our practices of 
saying things to one another are not “merely something that all or most do in fact follow” but are 
“something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon” (Grice 1989, p. 
29). 
Grice’s work on these two topics occurs in connection with distinct philosophical problems, 
and although there are obvious connections between both attempts to articulate the rational 
constitution of serious communication, Grice’s macro-level account of the CP and his micro-
level analysis of utterance-meaning are rarely discussed in relation to one another.  
Argumentation theorists have devoted considerable attention to the CP and associated Maxims, 
but they have hardly noticed Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning.  This pattern of attention and 
neglect is unfortunate.  There are serious difficulties with Grice’s discussion of both topics, but 
as, I argue below, his analysis of utterance-meaning is open to repairs which, in turn, leave the 
CP flawed and unnecessary. 
2. The Cooperative Principle and Its Sorrows.  
Grice’s Cooperative Principle reflects a deep insight into the rational structure of 
communicative endeavors, viz., the capacity of communicative acts to, e. g., convey information, 
provide explanations, give directions, offer reasons and so on, according to which it depends 
critically on the commitments persons incur in conjunction with their ostensible reasons for 
participating in conversations.  In its simplest form this insight grows out of an intuition 
regarding the value of veracity and relevance and, perhaps, economy and perspicuity in 
communicative enterprises.  Other things being equal, these virtues are so important to the 
possibility of successful communication, that a person’s willingness to participate in a serious 
conversation must, it seems, depend on a commitment to these virtues taken up by 
conversationalists as they accept the goals and objectives of this or that serious communicative 
endeavor.  Grice initially tried to flesh out this insight by explicating communicative 
relationships in terms of commitments incurred by partners in cooperative undertakings, but, as 
we will see, this effort to represent serious talk as a species of cooperation turned out to be 
unsatisfactory. 
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Regarding communicative endeavors from a macro perspective.  Grice observes that 
characteristically  “each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set 
of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.  This purpose or direction may be fixed 
from the start (e. g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during 
the exchange;  it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable 
latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation).”  And as a rule, Grice observes, persons 
do try to make their conversational contributions “such as is required at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange”  (1989, p. 26).  While 
endeavoring to make appropriate and productive communicative contributions, Grice suggests, 
conversationalists presume each other will follow certain Maxims. 
Maxim of Quantity:  Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the talk exchange); do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required. 
Maxim of Quality (supermaxim):  Try to make your contribution one that is true.  Do not 
say what you believe to be false.  Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Relation:  Be relevant. 
Maxim of Manner:  Avoid obscurity of expression, ambiguity, prolixity, and disorder 
(1989, p. 26-27). 
The expectation that fellow conversations will conform to these Maxims amounts to the 
supposition their talk will have the virtues of economy (Maxim of Quantity), veracity (Maxim of 
Quality), relevance (Maxim of Relation) and perspicuity.  Conversationalists, Grice suggests, 
rely upon something like these Maxims in interpreting what each other say. 
These practices of coordinating conversations around mutually recognized objectives and 
expecting speakers to observe certain Maxims, Grice maintains, are not merely conventional or 
arbitrary, they are rational.  His initial macro-level attempt to explicate the rationality 
constitutive of ordinary conversational practices relied on the idea that talk exchanges “are 
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts” (1989, p. 26).  In thinking along 
these lines Grice took certain kinds of conversations, those in which, e.g., information is 
exchanged or persons influence each other, as being typical or representative of serious and 
productive talk (1989, pp. 28 & 30).  “For a time,” Grice reports, he was attracted by the idea 
that the purposive organization of talk exchanges “could be thought of as a quasi-contractual 
matter, with parallels outside the realm of discourse” (1989, p. 29).  Thus, he was inclined to 
suppose that productive talk exchanges “exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly 
distinguish cooperative transactions.” 
 
1) The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended;  
their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict. . . . In 
characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-
wall chat, it is a second-order one, namely, that each party should, for the time 
being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interest of the other. 
2) The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. 
3) There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often 
tacit) that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in 
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appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate.  You 
do not just shove off or start doing something else (1989, p. 29). 
 
So Grice came to identify the expectation that S is to make her conversational contribution 
“such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange” as the “Cooperative Principle.” 
Notice that the CP reflects the insight that the rational structure of communicative endeavors 
identified above  (the capacity of communicative acts to, e. g., convey information, provide 
explanations, give directions, offer reasons and so on) depends critically on the commitments 
persons incur on the basis of their ostensible reasons for participating in conversations.  Grice’s 
initial idea was that speakers, as participants in a talk exchange share a common conversational 
objective (e. g., exchange of information), the realization of which is mutually dependent on their 
respective contributions.  And this “cooperative” pattern of objectives carries with it a certain 
commitment:  “other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style 
unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate.”  A commitment, that is, to the CP and 
its Maxims.  So Grice’s initial view that (serious) conversations are fundamentally cooperative 
enterprises tried to identify how the ostensible reasons speakers (and addressees) have for 
communicating with one another are related to the commitments speakers incur:  it holds that 
those commitments arise out of the quasi-contractual nature of cooperative relationships, where 
there is a mutually recognized and mutually beneficial objective the realization of which is seen 
to depend on dovetailing contributions. 
However, Grice himself abandoned this effort to represent the obligations typically incurred 
by serious speakers as quasi-contractual commitments undertaken on a cooperative basis (1989, 
p. 29).  There are good reasons for this decision. 
First, as Grice and others have noted, some important kinds of talk exchange are patently 
non-cooperative.  Some exceptions manifestly involve a degree of coercion which precludes 
cooperation;  in others one party is plainly indifferent to the objectives, goals, etc. of the other.  
Grice recognizes quarrels as falling in this latter category.  But to that must be added much 
institutional discourse, in which bureaucrats proceed on the basis of the regulations established 
by their organizations and with notorious indifference to the goal orientation of their clients 
(Sarangi and Slembrouck 1992).  Accusations represent a range of cases involving coercion.  The 
accuser typically impugns the accused’s conduct, manifestly intending to render the accused 
unable to effectively deny the accuser’s allegations and to impose on him an obligation to answer 
for what he is charged with doing (Kauffeld 1998).   
These exceptions raise the very serious question of whether the kinds of conversation which 
Grice initially took to be central to human communication, conversation in which information (or 
reasons) is exchanged, are typical or representative of human communication.  As Dennis 
Stampe notes, ordinary asking and telling does not generally involve an exchange of information 
(1967, p. 24). If A asks S for the time, the question may do its work even though A is in no 
position to provide S with a corresponding bit of information (or other reward), and typically A is 
not expected to do so.  Nor can it be argued that exchanges of information are representative of 
communication in which speakers and addressees presume things which correspond to Grice’s 
Maxims.  The presumption that S is to comply with the Maxim of Quality (i. e., conform what 
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she says to the requirements of veracity) is certainly not restricted to or uniquely applicable in 
conversations which involve an exchange of information. 
Second, the CP, as initially interpreted by Grice, does not square with what Strawson calls 
our “reactive attitudes” toward reprehensible violations of key Maxims (1968).  A satisfactory 
account of the expectations conversationalists form about each others’ contributions should fit 
the caliber of the resentment and/or disappointment they direct toward reprehensible violations 
of those expectations.  In this regard Grice, himself, recognizes that the CP as initially 
interpreted does not provide a satisfactory foundation for the Maxim of Relation.  “In any case,” 
he observes, “one feels that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his 
audience but himself” (1989, p.29).  Here we have a key intuition.  If S ‘s remarks miss the point 
or are obscure, we may resent the fact that she has wasted or abused our time and attention, but 
we also have a deeper sense of S’s failure in these circumstance, viz., that she has not lived up to 
a standard which she set for herself.  The CP’s failure to square with our reactive attitudes is 
even clearer in cases where S  fails to fulfill the expectation that she will make a responsible 
effort to speak the truth.  A critical problem for the idea that the “Cooperative Principle” 
articulates the rational principle underlying the Maxim of Quality arises from the caliber of the 
criticism we direct at mendacity and falsehood.  As Dennis Stampe observes. 
 
. . . the sins and virtues proper to cooperative behavior, viz., such species of (un)fairness 
as failure to do one’s part, take one’s turn, etc., are not those characteristic of 
communicative behavior (Dishonesty is not a species of unfairness.)  One who lies is 
only in special circumstance accused of unfairness—circumstances, for instance in 
which, information, say space technological information, is being exchanged.   The 
peculiarity of cooperative behavior, I think, is that partners expend themselves in the 
understanding those cooperating will do likewise.  There is not generally anything of this 
sort in ordinary asking, telling, etc. (1967, p. 24).  
 
Were the expectation that S is to speak truthfully grounded in the supposition that S and A 
are engaged in a cooperative enterprise, we should expect that lying and mendacity would be 
criticized as species of unfairness;  instead, we regard lies as deliberate attempts to induce us to 
believe potentially harmful false beliefs, and we apportion our resentment accordingly. 
Difficulties along these lines have led Grice to abandon the notion that the CP is 
straightforwardly grounded in the cooperative (quasi-contractual) nature of communication and 
have left Grice inclined toward a somewhat broader and more tentative interpretation of the CP.   
 
I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims 
is reasonable (rational) along the following lines:  that anyone who cares about the goals 
that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving 
information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an 
interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be 
profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the 
Cooperative Principle and the maxims.  Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I 
am uncertain (1989, p. 30). 
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This passage represents a considerable retreat from Grice’s original construction of the CP.  
It is important to notice from what he does and does not retire.   
Grice does not withdraw from the deep insight that productive communication is guided by 
mutually recognized objectives which somehow commit speakers to acting in conformity his 
Maxims.  Veracity, relevance, perspicuity, and economy are (obviously) so important to serious 
productive talk, in Grice’s view, that somehow acceptance of the purposes of such talk must 
commit speakers to conforming their utterances to the Maxims.  This insight, it seems, is 
supported by a transcendental deduction of sorts based on the clear pragmatic importance of 
veracity, relevance, perspicuity, and economy to serious communication, together with the idea 
that persons could not be expected to undertake serious communicative objectives without some 
commitments which enable conversational “partners” to presume that each other will conform to 
Gricean Maxims. 
However, in reconsidering the CP Grice has, at least temporarily, given up the effort to 
articulate any rational principle which might connect, on the one hand, a speaker’s (and 
addressee’s) undertaking a conversational objective with, on the other hand, her (and his) 
commitment to veracity, relevance, economy and perspicuity.  Grice’s original idea connected 
(i) mutual recognition of conversational objectives to (ii) speaker commitments (and addressee 
expectations) by reason of (iii) the quasi-contractual nature of cooperation, but the latter linkage 
does not survive his reconceptualization of basic communication Principles.  It is hard to see how 
Grice’s revision of the CP retains any robust connection to cooperation.  Someone extracting 
answers from a prisoner by means of torture might recognize, and act on, the idea that the 
inquisition will be profitable only on the supposition that the prisoner is to make his 
conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which both are engaged, and the inquisitor might 
well be willing to compel answers conforming to Gricean Maxims.  But we should hardly be 
inclined to say that in complying with the inquisitor’s threats, the poor prisoner was cooperating.  
Surely, Michael Bratman is right when he argues that cooperative relationships are not based on 
coercion (1999, p. 100).1  Nor will it do to say that interrogation under coercive conditions does 
not involve “goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving 
information, influencing and being influenced by others).” The point here is that, as 
reconstructed, Grice’s conversational Principle no longer even purports to identify a rational 
 
1Intuitions may vary as to whether coercion precludes describing a relationship as cooperative.  But plainly 
where coercion is the predominant consideration cooperation loses the quasi-contractual character on which Grice 
relied in his initial construction of the CP.  It would be silly to describe the prisoner interrogated under threat of 
torture as bound to continue “in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate.”  The 
prisoner is not bound to continue nor does the interrogation respect what is agreeable to him.  He is forced to 
continue at the mercy of the interrogator.  Notice that as revised by Grice, the CP not longer satisfies the conditions 
van Eemeren and colleagues regard as optimal for cooperation:  “The Cooperative Principle optimally presumes 
joint activity.  People are presumed to be helpful, not just taking account of one another’s purposes, but actually 
taking them up”  (Eemeren, Grootendorst et al. 1993, p. 7).  
It would be infamous to say that in complying with the demands of torturers, prisoners were actually taking up 
the conversational purposes of their interrogators. 
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basis which links mutually identified conversational objectives with a speaker’s commitment to 
veracity, relevance, economy and perspicuity. 
The retreat implicit in Grice’s reconsideration of his basic conversational Principle is 
considerable.  To take only one, but perhaps the most important of Grice’s Maxims, that of 
Quality, our ordinary expectation that a speaker is to make a responsible effort to speak the truth 
is plainly framed in terms of what the speaker is committed to, given what she has said (Vlach 
1981, pp. 368-69, 382-83).  And this idea, that a speaker’s veracity is a matter of commitment to 
her utterance, is deeply rooted in our intuitions about the reasons we have, ceterius paribus, for 
responding to others’ communicative projects in ways that fit with their ostensible objectives.  In 
a project devoted to explicating the rationality which constitutes our communicative practices, it 
should be possible to articulate how recognition of S’s (ostensible) aims is related to her 
commitment to the veracity of her utterances.  For a more adequate Gricean perspective on this 
problem we should now turn to our philosopher’s micro-level analysis of  utterance-meaning. 2 
3. The Practical Constitution of Utterance-Meaning.  
Where the CP and associated Maxims apply globally to conversations, Grice’s studies of 
utterance-meaning provide a micro-level analysis of our concept of the ordinary act of saying 
(and meaning) something, the primary act out of which conversations and other communicative 
undertakings are built (1989, pp. 25 and 87).  This shift from a macro to micro-level study of 
communication requires some adjustment in Grice’s conceptual apparatus.  At a macro-level 
Grice thinks in terms of the common set of purposes or mutually accepted direction recognized 
by participants in a conversation, but when approaching talk at a micro-level, he focuses on the 
intentions speakers manifest in saying something and on the reasons addressees have for 
responding as speakers manifestly intend.  And this finer attention to the primary communicative 
act of saying and meaning something throws the virtue of veracity into high relief, pushing 
relevance, etc., to the background.  But Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning reflects his 
continuing interest in the rational structure of communication.3  While we will find it necessary 
to supplement Grice’s analysis with a richer interpretation of its underlying  pragmatics, here at a 
micro-level of study we can make out the rational connections between a speaker’s manifest 
intentions (S  ostensible communicative objective),  what those intentions commit her to, and A’s  
reasons for acceding to the speaker’s manifest intentions and responding as intended. 
The most defensible version of Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning holds that it will be 
true that some speaker (S) means something by an utterance (u), if and only if, S produces u with 
the following complex intention.  
 
 
2 Some of Grice’s associates seem to regard his analysis of utterance-meaning as his sole effort to represent the 
rational structure of communication,  see Grandy and Warner 1986. 
3 Grice’s conception of utterance-meaning embraces the full range of meaningful expressions used in human 
communication, including gestures, inscriptions, etc., but it is fair to say that his analysis focuses on the primary 
communicative act which we ordinarily describe using indirect speech reports of the form ‘speaker says that p’, 
where p represents what the speaker means (Strawson 1964, p. 449; Grice 1989, pp. 86-88). 
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S’s primary communicative intention (I1): S intends1 that some addressee (A) respond (r) 
that p (or at least act as if S intends1 that A r that p); 
 
S’s second communicative intention (I2): S intends2 that A recognize S’s primary sub-
intention (or at least acts as if S intends2 that A recognize I1); 
 
S’s third communicative intention (I3): S intends3 that A recognize S’s secondary sub-
intention (or at least act as if S intends3 that A recognize I2);  and 
 
S’s fourth communicative intention (I4): S intends4 that A’s complex recognition of S’s 
communicative intentions provide A with at least part of A’s reason for ring that p (or at 
least act if S were speaking with this intention). 4  
 
According to this analysis it will be true that Mary has said that Uncle Bill is ill, if she has 
uttered something A is to take as semantically equivalent to ‘Uncle Bill is ill’, and if this 
utterance is part of a complex effort on her part to get A to, e.g., believe that Uncle Bill is ill, and 
if that effort includes an attempt to get A both to recognize that she is trying to secure that belief 
and to recognize that Mary wants A to recognize that she is trying to get him to believe that 
Uncle Bill is ill, and if this complex effort is designed to provide A with reason to believe that 
Uncle Bill is ill (or Mary at least acts as if it is so designed).  In executing these intentions, S 
deliberately (I2) and openly (I3) gives A to believe that S is trying to get A to, e. g., believe that p. 
On its face, Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning casts some light on how conversational 
objectives come to be mutually recognized and accepted by participants in conversations.  Of 
course, the objectives for conversations become established on a wide variety of bases, many of 
which have little to do with the nature of talk and everything to do with what we talk about, 
institutional procedures, etc.  But Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning suggests something 
about how conversational objectives come to be established on the basis of resources inherent in 
talk. 
According to the fourth condition in the analysis, S intends4 that A’s complex recognition of 
S’s intentions provide A with at least part of A’s reason for ring that p. Presumably, we would not 
have a stable concept of seriously saying something which is predicated on the strategy evident 
in S’s fourth communicative intention, if that strategy were not routinely efficacious, at least in 
favorable circumstances.5 Assuming that to be so, we may reasonably infer that in favorable 
 
4The conditions which Grice sets out as necessary to utterance-meaning have grown in complexity with 
successive publications.  My remarks use a formulation of intermediate complexity drawn from "Utterer's Meaning 
and Intention" (Grice 1969, pp. 154-157). This formulation has origins in P. G. Strawson's "Intention and 
Convention in Speech Acts" (1964, pp. 439-460), and in Stampe's work ( 1967;  1975).  
 
5 Some non-trivial assumptions are necessary at this point.  Grice’s analysis is, after all, an analysis of our 
concept of seriously saying something;  whereas, our interest is in the rational structure of actual conversations.  
However, we do truthfully give reports of the form ‘S said that p.  If Grice’s analysis is sound, it shows the 
conditions which must, at a minimum, obtain in order for such reports to be true.  So, supposing the analysis to be 
 
 
 
Grice Without The Cooperative Principle  8 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
circumstances speakers do manage to provide addressees with reason to suppose, e.g., that S is 
saying something worthy of A’s belief; accordingly, (in favorable circumstances) A would have 
basis for identifying and accepting S’s primary intention as an objective of the conversation.  
Likewise, supposing that Grice’s analysis points to a potentially efficacious strategy, we see that 
S would have good practical reason to take her primary intention as her ostensible 
communicative objective;  she would reasonably expect (ceteris paribus) that by deliberately and 
openly manifesting that intention, she would realize its objective.  Although we have focused on 
cases in which S’s aim is to induce belief, it is possible to identify parallel strategies for a wide 
range of other addressee-responses, such as inducing A to consider whether p.  Thus, it seems 
that a variety of conversational objectives might come to be mutually recognized and accepted 
on the basis of Gricean communicative intentions. 
However, two crucially important matters remain obscure.  First, while the analysis suggests 
that in favorable circumstances S’s manifest intentions do provide A with reason to respond as S 
primarily intends,  it is far from obvious how just that could happen.  And, second, the more 
widely received Gricean accounts of the pragmatics of utterance-meaning do not adequately 
explain the essential components of seriously saying something, leaving us with an 
unsatisfactory picture of the contribution which suppositions about S’s veracity make to the 
efficacy of serious utterances. 
The first of these problems arises from the fact that the practical function of the reflexive 
speaker intentions posited by Grice is not adequately explicated by his analysis.  According to 
the analysis these communicative intentions (I2 and I3) are supposed to have a pragmatic 
function, viz., they are (ostensibly) designed to serve as part of A’s reason for responding as 
primarily intended.  But as Alfred F. MacKay and others have argued, it is not obvious that 
getting A to recognize S ‘s intention to, e. g., induce A to believe that p could possibly provide A 
with reason to so respond (1972).  And it must be acknowledged that this objection seems at first 
to have merit.  Suppose that as a good Gricean speaker, I succeed in getting  you to recognize 
that I want you to know that I am trying to get you to, e. g. believe what I am saying.  How could 
that recognition ever provide you with reason to believe it?   And if that is problematic, how 
could I reasonably expect that by manifesting my communicative intentions, I might secure the 
response I openly seek.  This difficulty is not addressed by the analysis itself.  The analytical 
motivation for Grice’s definition of utterance-meaning does not show how the conditions posited 
could function practically from the point of view of the speakers and addressees.  Andreas 
Kemmerling nicely summarized this point.  
 
When he introduced them, Grice . . .  justified (the ascription of) these intentions by way 
of counterexamples, but there was no explanation of why S had these intentions when all 
he wanted was, after all, to produce a certain reaction in his audience.  A ‘substantial’ 
 
sound, we may suppose that the conditions Grice posits as essential to our conception of saying something are, in 
fact, components of serious utterances.  Moreover, and somewhat more problematic, we may suppose that our 
concept of saying something is the concept of an act which in favorable (or paradigmatic) circumstances can be 
successfully executed.  If our concept of saying something were not constituted by a coherent and potentially 
efficacious practical calculation, one would doubt that the practice to which we refer when using the concept would 
have survived long enough for us to have formed a stable idea about its essentials. 
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justification would, at least, have to specify the further conditions which make S’s 
complex intentions plausible in the light of his basic desire to get A to do r  (1986, p. 
148). 
 
The absence of a “substantial” justification leaves the practical rationality of the enterprise 
in the dark.  So the analysis posits a rational link between S’s manifest intentions and A’s 
responding as S primarily intends, but the analysis does not identify a plausible reason or line of 
reasoning which might connect the two. 
While Grice and associates have provided a compelling and highly regarded defense of his 
analysis of utterance-meaning (Avramides 1989, p. ix), for the most part the literature on this 
topic does not give the pragmatics of saying something the careful attention that topic requires 
and, so, fails to satisfactorily illuminate the reason(s) which might lead Grice’s auditor to 
respond as his speaker primarily intends.  
To be sure, defense of Grice’s analysis has recognized the need for further elaboration of the 
rationale addressees might be expected to have for responding as S primarily intends. The most 
widely shared emendation suggests that a Gricean configuration of speaker intentions functions 
where it is assumed that S is trustworthy.  Strawson puts the idea this way.  
. . . it hardly seems too much to say that it is a part, though normally a subdued or 
submerged part, of the genuine communication intentions, that the audience’s response to 
his performance should be governed by certain (normally subdued or submerged) 
assumptions regarding his (the communicator’s) sincerity and reliability  (1964, pp. 284-
285). 
This supplement brings us closer to an adequate account of the efficacy of serious 
utterances.  If you can assume that I am trustworthy, i. e., that I believe what I am saying and 
have made a reliable effort to establish the truth of my expressed beliefs, then the fact that I 
apparently want you to believe what I am saying can (ceteris paribus) serve as reason for you to 
believe me.  Accordingly, in this circumstances I could reasonably expect to generate a reason 
for you to give credence to what I say merely by manifesting my intention to secure your belief.  
Many theorists accept the idea that the practical efficacy of Gricean communicative intentions 
can be satisfactorily explicated on the (background) assumption that S is regarded as trustworthy 
(Strawson 1964, pp. 284-285; Bennett 1976, p. 145; Sperber and Wilson 1986, pp. 22, 163 & 
195; Recanati 1987, pp. 186-187; Avramides 1989, p. 16; Grice 1989, p. 294).  
However, merely adding a background assumption to the effect that S is trustworthy does 
not support a satisfactory account of the practical calculations which constitute a Gricean 
conception of saying something.6 First, assuming trust as a background condition does not afford 
an explanation in practical terms for why it is conceptually necessary for S to openly give it to 
believed that she is trying to get A to, e.g., believe what she is saying.  If I can rely upon the 
supposition that you regard me as trustworthy and will, accordingly, take my apparent intention 
 
6 Bringing trust in as a background assumption makes the confidence we have in what people say to us depend 
entirely on their reputations.  While reputation is often an important component in a speaker’s credibility, we often 
have satisfactory reason to believe speakers whose reputation for trustworthiness is unknown to us. 
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to get you to believe that p as evidence that p is the case, then practically I can provide you with 
reason for granting credence to my utterances merely by making it apparent that I want  to you to 
believe that p.  I do not need to openly intend that you also recognize that I am deliberately 
giving you to believe that I am trying to get you to believe that p.  Second, Stawson’s insertion of 
trust as a background assumption does not yield an account of S’s practical reasoning that 
squares with our reactive attitudes toward lying.  Where a person acts as if she wants another to 
believe that p and assumes that the other party will regard her as trustworthy and thereupon will 
believe that p, but does so herself believing that p is false, our agent will have misled the party 
she is trying to influence.  If our would-be-influencer has good reason to expect that her victim 
will respond on the basis of trust, then her effort is all the more reprehensible.  Nevertheless, we 
do not have a case in which one person has lied to the other.  This point is further reinforced by 
the fact that in accusations and in bargaining, serious utterances may function under 
circumstances in which speakers cannot reasonably expect their addressees to assume that they 
are trustworthy.  
Missing from this widely received account of the Gricean speaker’s practical reasoning is 
some idea of how S’s manifest intentions  commit her to the veracity of her utterances and, so, 
provide A with reason to suppose that S is sincerely expressing beliefs the truth and adequacy of 
which she has made a responsible effort to ascertain (Vlach 1981, pp. 368-69, 382-83).   Dennis 
Stampe gives, I will be arguing, a satisfying account of these connections.  Stampe maintains that 
Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning identifies the rudimentary means that are practically 
necessary to openly engage S’s responsibility for the veracity of her utterances, thereby 
providing A with reason to respond as primarily intended.  
On Grice's account it is a necessary condition of meaning something by an utterance that 
the utterer intend his audience's recognition of his intention to produce a certain response 
to be a reason of some sort for his audience's responding as intended.  I remarked that it 
was not obvious why it should be a reason. . . . But now we may reflect that in 
recognizing the primary intention the audience is, eo ipso, recognizing the speaker's 
responsibility for his (speech) act.  Now the mere fact that I recognize you to be 
responsible for a certain matter by no means entails that I have any reason to trust your 
motives or rely on your word.  So in intending you to recognize my intention and hence 
responsibility I therefore cannot yet be said to have given you reason to respond as 
intended.  After all, you may think that you were not intended to recognize that primary 
intention and hence my responsibility--as if it were like a case of overseeing someone 
planting evidence or perceiving that someone is posturing.  But if you recognize that I 
intend you to recognize what my intention is, you therein recognize my willingness to 
incur responsibility for what I do or say.  And this means that I am apparently willing to 
brook adverse reaction if what I say is not well founded, not true, etc.; so that it is 
reasonable for the audience to believe what I say so long as he may reasonably suppose 
that I stand to gain no advantage from mendacity, duplicity, or the like, which outweighs 
the disapprobation, etc., which I may expect to ensue upon the realization that I lied 
(etc.).  We may conclude from these considerations that a sound strategy for inducing 
belief would be to achieve audience recognition of the secondary intention, that the 
primary intention be recognized (1967).   
Here Stampe fits the Gricean essentials of utterance-meaning into a coherent practical 
calculation on the part of the speaker.  Within that calculation A is to be provided reason to 
presume that S is making a responsible effort to sincerely speak the truth and, hence, with reason 
for believing what  S says.  Moreover, this rationale is generated using just those means which 
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Grice’s analysis shows to be essential components of our concept of saying and meaning 
something.  
Consider the merits of Stampe’s account of the practical constitution of saying and meaning 
something. 
First, Stampe’s interpretation of the pragmatics of seriously saying something shows how at 
the core of conversational practices S and A can have coordinated reasons for accepting mutually 
identified purposes.  In the difficult case of belief-inducing utterance, where S primarily intends 
that A believe that p, A is provided with reason to presume that S is trying to tell him something 
which may well be worthy of belief.  And we can now see the line of reasoning by which A may 
arrive at that presumption, given what S does in seriously saying that p. By deliberately and 
openly making known her primary intention, S openly takes responsibility for her attempt to 
secure the response she primarily seeks;  she thereby patently ensures that she would be fully 
accountable for her effort to induce A to believe that p.  A is then entitled to infer that S would 
not be manifestly willing to risk criticism, resentment and retribution for her communicative 
efforts were she not proceeding with regard for the requirements of veracity.  Likewise, we can 
now see how S would have reason to suppose that by deliberately and openly manifesting her 
primary intention she may achieve its aim. 
And this account of belief-inducing utterances can be extended to a wide variety of purposes 
which are intimately related to communicative means.  A good indication of the versatility of 
Stampe’s account of the pragmatics of utterance-meaning comes from the insight it affords into a 
range of illocutionary acts, i. e., acts which are necessarily performed in and by saying 
something.  Illocutionary acts, it will be recalled,  serve a variety of communicative purposes:  
proposing characteristically puts forward matters for consideration, advising typically directs an 
addressee’s attention to matters involving his concerns, accusing imposes on addressees an 
obligation to respond to the speaker’s allegations.  These and similar speech acts are built on the 
resources inherent in saying and meaning something.  They are constituted by practical 
calculations which require that S deliberately and openly undertake commitments which enlarge 
or focus or strengthen the core presumption that she is to speak the truth.  Thus, in making a 
proposal a speaker not only commits herself (as a matter of veracity) to having made a 
reasonable effort to ascertain the truth of the beliefs she expresses but also to providing reasons 
which support the rational adequacy of the proposition she puts forward for consideration.  A 
proposer can, thereby, generate reason to suppose that what she has to say on behalf of her 
proposal merits serious consideration (Kauffeld 1998).  She can, that is, warrant commitment to 
a mutually recognized conversational purpose other than that of securing belief.  In principle 
Stampe’s account of the pragmatics of serious utterance can be extended to any communicative 
purpose which A can be brought to accept on the basis of some presumption generated by 
expanding, refining, strengthening, etc. the core presumption of veracity. 
Second, Stampe’s account explains in practical terms why the essentials identified by 
Grice’s analysis are necessary components of our concept of seriously saying something.  That 
is, Stampe shows the constituents of that concept to be practically necessary components of a 
coherent and potentially efficacious strategy for inducing belief (and other communicatively 
attainable responses) from addressees—a strategy which very plausibly underlies and constitutes 
our ordinary concept of saying something.  In order to warrant the presumption that she is 
making a responsible effort to speak the truth, S must provide her addressee with assurance that S 
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expects to be fully accountable for the veracity of her utterance.  To provide that assurance S 
needs not only to make available to A her intention1 to get A to r, she must also make it apparent 
that she wants A to recognize her secondary communicative intention.  Thus Stampe’s account 
enables us to see both the rationality of A’s responding as S primarily intends and also the 
practical rationale for each component in the effort S expends trying to secure that response, 
including S’s attempt to get A to recognize communicative intention2.  Prevailing interpretations 
of the pragmatics of serious utterance, it will be recalled, fail to adequately account for that 
effort. 
Third, it is apparent that Stampe’s account of the practical syllogism underlying seriously 
saying something squares with our reactive attitudes toward mendacity.  We hold speakers 
responsible for the veracity of what they say, expecting them both to express beliefs they actually 
hold and to have made a responsible effort to ascertain the truth of those beliefs.  This 
expectation is nicely explained by the observation that in saying that p a speaker openly takes 
responsibility for the truthfulness of her utterance.  As we have seen, the CP encounters 
difficulty on just this point. 
Fourth, corroboration for Stampe’s conjecture about the practical constitution of serious 
utterance can be found by observing the continuity between the strategy Stampe attributes to 
speakers and a large array of ordinary practices and inferences.7  In Stampe’s view, the essentials 
of utterance-meaning are the elementary components of a practical strategy for generating a 
presumption of veracity on behalf of S’s utterance.  We routinely and quite naturally call the 
expectation that a speaker ought speak truthfully a presumption (Llewelyn 1962, pp. 162-66; 
Stampe 1967, pp. 25-29; Grice 1975, p. 47; Stampe 1975, pp. 18-31; Recanati 1987, pp. 119, 
186-87; Akmajian, Demers et al. 1990, pp. 316-18; Eemeren, Grootendorst et al. 1993, pp. 6-11).  
If we pause briefly to notice what presumptions are, we can see that the seemingly complex 
inference a Gricean speaker expects her addressee draw from her manifest intentions belongs to 
that large and familiar class of commonplace inferences. 
Presumptions, in the plain sense of the term, comprise a species of inference.  To presume 
something is to take it in the broad sense of mentally taking which embraces acts of assuming, 
inferring, concluding, etc.  As inferences, presumptions are distinguished by the grounds on 
which they are available to be taken (Kauffeld 1995). To presume that p, a person must come to 
hold that p by reason of the supposition that some one has or will have made it the case that p 
rather than risk resentment, retribution, etc.  for acting otherwise (Kauffeld 2001).  A 
presumption is simply a conclusion which is held on this basis or is available on the back of such 
a reason.  If Jones says that the game will begin at seven, we may presume that he has made a 
responsible effort to speak the truth in view of the risk he runs of criticism for failing to do so.  
Here what is presumed is the proposition that Jones has made a responsible effort to speak the 
 
7 The seemingly intricate reflexive structure of speaker intentions which Grice posits has led some scholars to 
doubt whether his analysis reflects a realistic view of human communication (Black 1975, p. 118; Grandy and 
Warner 1986, pp. 8-13; Grice 1986, pp. 80-85; Avramides 1989, p. 14).  However, consideration of the continuity 
between the strategy Stampe attributes to speakers and presumptions generally show Gricean reflexive speaker 
intentions to be the basis for very a ordinary and familiar mode of inference. 
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truth.  But derivatively other propositions may also come to be presumed.  Thus, presuming that 
Jones speaks the truth, we may also presume that the game will start at seven.  
Presumptions make up a very large class of inferences, which encompasses a goodly portion 
of the expectations we have about how others will conduct themselves.  We commonly use the 
expression ‘He/she would not dare to (do anything so outrageous as) . . . .’ to articulate 
presumptive inferences.  We also mark out presumptions by expressing the expectation that a 
person will do x because she would not be willing to bear the guilt or remorse for acting 
otherwise.  Where a person violates our expectations by behaving presumptuously (in the 
pejorative sense of the term), we say things like ‘how dare he act in such a high handed manner’. 
These familiar idioms remind us how widely we depend on presumptive inferences. 
The strategy Stampe attributes to S  utilizes the resources common to a major and especially 
interesting class of presumptions, which may conveniently be called special presumptions—
presumptions which one deliberately generates by providing others with grounds to presume 
things favorable to one’s endeavors.8 Leaving a deposit in order to provide reason to believe that 
one will return a borrowed item is an example of acting so as to generate a special presumption.  
Likewise, when one tells a class that one docks late papers a full grade and accepts no excuses, 
one deliberately acts to strengthen the presumption that papers are to be turned in on time.  Here 
one engages a special presumption by action designed to manifestly ensure that students will be 
held accountable for living up to their responsibilities. 
Stampe’s speaker relies on  a variant of this familiar strategy  for generating special 
presumptions by ensuring accountability.  By deliberately and openly giving A to believe that 
she is, e.g., trying to induce A to believe that p, S patently puts herself in a position where she 
cannot deny responsibility for her primary communicative effort.  In short she manifestly ensures 
that she is fully accountable for her attempt to influence A’s beliefs.  Her actions in this 
connection parallel those of the teacher who conspicuously lays down conditions designed to 
preclude the expectation that a student might be able to evade responsibility for turning in work 
as assigned.  Both license an inference by patently ensuring that agents would be inescapably 
accountable for their conduct.9 
I have been arguing that Stampe’s  account of the pragmatics which constitute our concept 
of saying and meaning something makes good on Grice’s attempt to represent the respects in 
 
8 Special presumptions are to be distinguished from standing presumptions, which are generally available on 
the supposition that prudent associates will act so as not to occasion foreseeable resentment and which are available 
without any special effort to generate or engage them. 
 
9 Some scholars have expressed concern over the possibility that the configuration of reflexive speaker 
intentions posited by Grice may open out into an unbounded regress  (Strawson 1964, p. 447; Schiffer 1972, pp. 18-
26; Black 1975, pp. 117-18 & 137-38; Recanati 1987, pp. 191-207).   Comprehension of the practical rationale 
underlying Grice’s configuration of speaker intentions ought to quiet fears that a regress threatens the analysis  
(Stampe 1967, p. 28).  The mark of utterance-meaning is not just that S aims primarily at a response warranted by 
recognition of her effort to secure that response.  Rather utterance acts on the order of saying that p are distinguished 
by S’s acting so as to openly take responsibility for her communicative effort and thereby warrant a presumption of 
veracity.  The possibility of a regress in Grice’s analysis has opened as scholars have, without the support of an 
articulated understanding of presumptive inference, tried to distinguish complex cases of staged sign inference from 
cases of utterance meaning. 
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which our conversational practices of saying things to one another are not “merely something 
that all or most do in fact follow” but are “something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that 
we should not abandon” (1989, p. 29).  Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning provides support 
for the idea that the primary communicative act of saying that p is practically designed to provide 
to A with a reason to respond as S primarily intends.  Stampe identifies the nature of this reason 
as a presumption and exhibits precisely how such presumptions are engaged by what S 
necessarily does in producing a meaningful utterance.  We have seen that this account fits our 
intuitions about S’s commitment to veracity, that it may be expected to explicate how speakers 
and addressees come to mutually identify and accept a wide variety of communicative 
objectives, and that it shows the rationality of communicative practices to be part and parcel with 
the wide range of ordinary inferences which we ordinarily recognizes as presumptions. 
4. The Cooperative Principle Revisited  
 In light of Stampe’s interpretation of the pragmatics of utterance-meaning, what are we to 
make of Grice’s Cooperative Principle?  The answer to this question, I think, is that, given 
Stampe’s account, in very important respects of the analysis utterance-meaning supercedes the 
CP. 
Both the CP  and the analysis of utterance-meaning attempt to explicate the rationality of 
serious communicative practices.  Both reflect the basic insight that the capacity of 
communicative acts to, e. g., convey information, provide explanations, give directions, offer 
reasons, etc., depends critically on the commitments persons incur in conjunction with their 
ostensible reasons for participating in conversations.  But working at a macro-level, Grice was 
unable to find a formulation of the CP which squares with the variety of non-cooperative 
communicative objectives speakers and addressees do, in fact, jointly pursue, which fits our 
reactive attitudes toward mendacity, and which identifies the rational connections between the 
commitments conversationalists undertake and their acceptance of mutually identified 
communicative objectives.  His micro-level analysis of utterance-meaning, on the other hand, 
puts us in a position to understand the rational structure of seriously saying something.  It 
identifies components which are practically necessary and, in favorable circumstances, sufficient 
to the core efficacy of seriously saying things.  Stampe’s account of the pragmatics of this act 
shows how what is done in saying something can provide S and A  with coordinate reasons for 
adopting mutually identified communicative objectives; it satisfactorily identifies the nature of 
the rational connectives which enable a manifest commitment to veracity to function in serious 
communication; and it provides an account of these connections which fits our intuitions about 
day-to-day presumptions. 
Much still remains to be seen.  My discussion of utterance-meaning has focused on the 
presumption of veracity and on utterances primarily intended to induce belief.  I have said little 
about how such other communicative virtues as relevance, economy, and perspicuity are related 
to the commitments speaker’s undertake and the reasons addressees have for accepting 
conversational objectives.  I have tried to indicate that Stampe’s account of the pragmatics of 
serious utterance can be extended to a wide range of illocutionary acts and, so, can illuminate the 
repertoire of strategies available for attaining a variety of objectives.  As we better understand 
proposing, accusing, advising, praising, etc., we may better comprehend the communicative 
sources of relevance.  But it is not at all clear that our expectation that serious utterances are to 
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be economical and perspicuous are on par with our expectations regarding veracity and relevance 
(Grice 1989, pp. 26-27 ).  So, it remains to be seen at a micro-level just how the Maxims of 
Quantity and Manner come into play. 
Can a Gricean account of utterance-meaning support an account of conversational 
implicatures, i. e., can it do the work for which the CP was initially designed.  This is a large and 
difficult question, complicated by the fact that it is not altogether clear that Grice’s CP and 
associated Maxims support an adequate account of conversational implicature (Davis 1998). I 
inclined to suppose that a pragmatic account of utterance-meaning can do much of the CP’s 
work.  Perhaps the CP could be replaced with a simpler formulation:  make your conversational 
contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the presumptions governing 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.  This “Principle” might be useful to scholars and 
teachers, but conversationalists would not have to rely upon that Principle in interpreting each 
others remarks, because the presumptions governing the conversation at any given point in time 
straight-forwardly commit participants to making appropriate contributions. 
Finally, I have had little to say about how my interpretation of Grice’s work on the 
rationality of communicative practices bears on studies of argumentation.  That is a very large 
topic to be worked out over a period of time by various approaches to the study of 
argumentation.  However, in common the various ways in which argumentation is currently 
studied suffer from the absence of an adequate and embracing account of how responsibilities 
and obligations are incurred in communicative acts.  Grice’s work is something like common 
text providing a well developed view of that topic—a text shared by various approaches to the 
study of argumentation.  In this essay I have tried to clarify some of what we ought learn from 
that text. 
References 
Akmajian, A.,  R. A., Demers, A. K. Farmer, & R. M. Harnish. 1990. Linguistics:  An Introduction to 
Language and Communication. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Avramides, A. 1989. Meaning and Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Bennett, J. 1976. Lingluistic Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Black, M. 1975. Caveats and Critiques: Philosophical Essays in Language, Logic, and Art. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Bratman, M. E. 1999. Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Davis, W. A. 1998. Implicature:  Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eemeren, F. H. van., R. Grootendorst,  S. Jackson, &  S. Jacobs. 1993. Reconstructing Argumentative 
Discourse. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press. 
Grandy, R. E. and R. Warner 1986. "Paul Grice:  A View of his Work." In R. E. Grandy and R. Warner 
(eds.). Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:  Intentions, Categories, Ends. 1-45. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. . 
Grice, H. P. 1969. “Utterer's Meaning and Intention.” Philosophical Review 78: 147-177. 
Grice, H. P. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.). Speech Acts. 41-58. New 
York: Academic Press. 
 
 
 
Grice Without The Cooperative Principle  16 
 
 
 
 
Grice, H. P. 1986. "Reply to Richards." In R. E. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.). Philosophical Grounds of 
Rationality:  Intentions, Cagegories and Ends. 45-108. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge:  Harvard University Press. 
Kauffeld, F. J. 1995. "On the Difference between Assumptions and Presumptions." In S. Jackson (ed.)  
Argumentation and Values:  Proceedings of the Ninth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation. 509-
515.  Annandale: Speech Communication Association.  
Kauffeld, F. J. 1998. “Presumption and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing 
and Accusing.” Argumentation 12: 245-266. 
Kauffeld, F. J. 2001. Argumentation, Discourse, and the Rationality Underlying Grice's Analysis of 
Utterance-Meaning. In E. Nemeth (eds.) Cognition in Language Use:  Selected Papers from the 7th 
International Pragmatics Conference, Vol. 1.  Antwerp, International Pragmatics Association. 
Kemmerling, A. 1986. Utterer's Meaning Revisited. In R. E. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.). Philosophical 
Grounds of Rationality:  Intentions, Categories, Ends. 131-157. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Llewelyn, J. E. 1962. “Presuppositions, Assumptions and Presumptions.” Theoria 28: 158-172. 
MacKay, A. F. 1972. “Professor Grice's Theory of Meaning.” Mind 8: 57-66. 
Recanati, F. 1987. Meaning and Force:  The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
Sarangi, S. K. and S. Slembrouck 1992. “"Non-Cooperation in Communication:  A Reassessment of 
Gricean Pragmatics.” Journal of Pragmatics 17: 117-154. 
Schiffer, S. R. 1972. Meaning. Oxford, Clarenden Press. 
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson 1986. Relevance:  Communication and Cognition. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press. 
Stampe, D. (1967). "On the Acoustic Behavior of Rational Animals." (Unpublished Paper) Madison:  
University of Wisconsin. 
Stampe, D. 1975. Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts. In  P. Cole and J. Morgan. Speech 
Acts. 25-38 New York, Academic Press.  
Strawson, P. F. 1964. “Intention and Convention in Speech Acts.” Philosophical Review 73: 439-460. 
Strawson, P. F. 1968. Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action. New York:  Oxford University 
Press. 
Vlach, F. 1981. “Speaker's Meaning.” Linguistics and Philosophy 4: 359-391. 
